【题目】Information Design, Externalities, and Government Interventions（信息设计，外部性和政府干预）

【主讲人】肖彦成博士

【主持人】周匀月博士

【时间】7月7日（周四）下午2:00

【地点】文二栋301会议室

【主讲人简介】肖彦成，美国田纳西大学诺克斯维尔校区经济学博士，银河电子游戏1331讲师。研究领域包括微观经济理论、网络理论和健康经济学，研究兴趣是把网络理论应用到疫苗接种、人口流动等的现实问题中去。论文见于European Economic Review等期刊。

【摘要】We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion with spillovers. A sender produces information to persuade a receiver to take an action with external effects. We consider how government interventions, including corrective taxes and subsidies, affect social welfare. In addition to internalizing externalities, government interventions affect social welfare through an informational channel. Subsidies to the sender's preferred action incentivize the sender to produce less information, but taxes on the sender's preferred action incentivize the sender to produce more information. Because of such an informational effect, the optimal corrective subsidies and taxes may be different from the Pigouvian level. In some cases, social welfare is maximized with no government intervention.